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INTRODUCTION
In the context of the movement towards privatization and
globalizafion, increasing reliance has been placed upon foreign direct
investment ("FDI") as a source of capital and stimulant of economic
* Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of
London. I am grateful to the Academic Council of United Nations System
("ACUNS") for its financial support, and to the participants at the 1999 ACUNS
Summer Workshop on Rebuilding Torn Societies at Yale University for comments
relating to earlier drafts of this paper.
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growth in developing countries. At the same time, the international
development assistance community has become preoccupied with the
impact of legal systems upon economic development in general, and
the promotion of inward FDI flows in particular.
During the 1990s, commentators and development practitioners
slipped fairly effortlessly towards consensus regarding the
relationship between legal systems and FDI. It is now generally
theorized first, that foreign investors are attracted to legal systems
which are predictable and efficient; and second, that it is possible to
identify a uniform set of characteristics which render any legal
system predictable and efficient (referred to here as the "Ideal
Paradigm").
The purpose of this paper is to question the validity of this theory.
The first section describes the core components of what
commentators consider to be an "attractive" legal system (the Ideal
Paradigm). In the second and third sections, the real attractiveness of
the Ideal Paradigm is tested. A case study is used to demonstrate that,
unlike the theorists, foreign investors in Sri Lanka do not necessarily
share a common definition of what constitutes an attractive legal
system. The possible reasons for the disparity between theory and
reality, and the implications of the findings are discussed in the
concluding section.
I. THE 'IDEAL PARADIGM' FOR ATTRACTING FDI
Since the 1980s, the World Bank has been "at the forefront" of a
"renascence" in law and development. Regional development banks,
and bilateral and multilateral aid organizations are now "major
participants" in the provision of funding and technical assistance for
law reform programs. These projects have been influential in setting
the academic agenda for discussion of the role of law in economic
development, as well as dictating the law reform agendas of
developing and transition states. However, the size and strength of
the World Bank means that it remains the most important source of
law and development funding and policy.'
1. Lawrence Tshuma, The Political Economy of the World Bank ' Legal
Framework for Economic Development, 8 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 75, 76 (1999).
See Amanda Perry, International Econony Organizations and the Modern Law
and Development, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR
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It is commonly agreed that "govemance"-the manner in which
economic policies are implemented-has a significant impact on the
effectiveness of economic policies! From the perspective of the
state, it is argued that "as important as what rules say... is what they
mean in practice. A pristine statute on investment that is unknown,
unadministered and unenforced is ineffective."' However, the
dominant tone of commentary on the relationship between legal
systems and development reflects an increased emphasis on the
importance of the private sector.
Following the decline of communism, a consensus has emerged
that the structure and behavior of the public sector should be guided
by the needs of the private sector." In the context of FDI, it is
therefore argued that the foreign investor should generally get what
the foreign investor wants, since their resulting investment will
eventually benefit the economy as a whole. But what does the
foreign investor want? According to the dominant theory, the foreign
investor's wish list can be boiled down to two essential items:
efficiency and certainty.
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCI 1, 19 (Ann Seidman
et al. eds., 1999).
2. Tshuma, supra note 1, at 78. See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 1, 4 (1992); DEP'T FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, Eliminating World
Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century 15 (1997); M. J. Trebilcock, What
Makes Poor Countries So Poor? The Role of hIstitutional Capital in Economic
Development, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 1, 19 (Eduardo
Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997).
3. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV;ELOPME\T, 1996
TRANSITION REPORT, 101 (1996).
4. Tshuma, supra note 1, at 76. See Jeswald Salacuse, From Developing
Countries to Emerging Markets, in FESTCHRIFT FUR BERNHARD GROSSFELD ZUNI
65, 925-33 (Ulrich Ubner et al. eds., 1999); SILVIO BORNER ET AL., POLITICAL
CREDIBILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 20-26, 150-53, 162 (1995); WORLD
BANK, 1996 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 85-89
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 WORLD BANK REPORT]; Foreign Investment Advisory
Service, Administrative Barriers to hivestment: The Red Tape .-lnalysi" (visited
Sept. 11, 2000) <http://wvww.fias.net/services' barriers.htm> [hereinafter FIAS];
World Bank Legal Department, The World Bank and Technical Legal ,4ssisance:
Initial Lessons (Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1414: IW ashington, DO 15;
Thomas W. Wilde & James Gunderson, Legislative Relbrm in Transition
Economies: Western Transplants-A Short-Cut to Social Market EcononmY Status?,
43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 347, 361 (1994); Douglass Webb, Legal Rebrms and
Private Sector Development, il ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTl", FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND THE LAW 45-46 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996).
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It is argued that the ideal legal system for attracting FDI is
efficient. An inefficient legal system increases transaction costs by
failing to provide cheap mechanisms for enforcing legal rights and
obligations.5 Low transaction costs are ensured where a host state's
laws are of good quality-that is, modern-and its courts and
bureaucracies are provided with adequate infrastructure, and trained
and properly compensated staff.7 Although their implementation is
likely to be constrained by financial considerations, these
recommendations are not particularly contentious.
There also exists a broad international consensus that deficiencies
in "the lawmaking process, the public administration and
enforcement of laws, and the judicial interpretation of laws ' in
5. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 114-19 (1988). See
WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 4.
6. Robert Sherwood et al., Judicial Systems and Economic Per/brnance, 34
Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 101-05 (1994) (quoting DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) and Douglas
North, Transaction Costs, Institutions and Economic Performance, in
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OCCASIONAL PAPERS No.
30 (1992)); ROLAND BROWN & PHILIP DANIEL, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION, The Legislative Environment For Foreign Investment in St.
Helena: A Report to the Overseas Development Administration London I I (1996)
(on file with the author); Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, EUROPEAN ECONOMY: REPORTS &
STUDIES 25-32 (1993) [hereinafter EC Commission]; Wdide & Gunderson, supra
note 4, at 353; Webb, supra note 4, at 47-48; Ibrahim F. Shihata, Preface: Good
Governance and the Role of Law in Economic Development, in MAKING
DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 1, XIX (Ann Seidman et al. eds.,
1999) [hereinafter Shihata, Good Goverance]; Ibrahim F. Shihata, THE WORLD
BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 228, 234, 590 (Fransiska Tschofen & Antonio R.
Parra eds., 1991); Pierre Guislain, THE PRIVATIZATION CHALLENGE: A STRATEGIC,
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ON INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 47-84
(1997).
7. 1996 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 4, at 94-95 (1996); WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 7-
8, 99-100 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 WORLD BANK REPORT]; Trebilcock, supra note
2, at 42; Sherwood, supra note 6, at 104-05, 113; JOHN M. STOPFORD ET AL..
RIVAL STATES, RIVAL FIRMS 126 (Steve Smith et al. eds., 1991); FIAS, supra note
4; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1995: TRENDS AND DETERMINANTS
277 (1995).
8. Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 40.
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developing and transition countries can result in uncertainty.' Legal
systems that fail to provide credible information regarding the status
of legal rights and obligations must be reformed in order to create
greater certainty for foreign investors. The World Bank's 1997
World Development Report relies on a survey of domestic and
foreign investors that demonstrates correlations between political
credibility, as perceived by the private sector, and investment levels;
countries with high perceived political credibility had high
investment rates, and vice versa. The report concludes that a
"government's credibility, the predictability of its rules and policies
and the consistency with which they are applied, can be as important
for attracting private investment as the content of the rules.""
But how is certainty best achieved? According to the dominant
theory, a legal system is most likely to be predictable where the laws
are stable," accessible,2' and clear;" the discretionary powers of the
state (including its bureaucrats) are limited;'4 corruption is low;" and
9. 1997 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 7, at 43.
10. Id. at 4. The concept of credibility was developed by BORNER ET. AL.,
supra note 4, at 26-46, and 77-78, who conducted a survey of twenty-eight
developing countries. A further survey by Borner et al. of sixty-nine countries was
commissioned for the World Development Report 1997, and came up with similar
results. 1997 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 7, at 32, 43. On the importance of
predictability in courts, see also Webb, supra note 4, at 52-53; Sherwood et al.,
supra note 6, at 104-105, 109, and 112; Shihata, Good Governance, supra note 6,
at xxiii; 1996 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 4, at 85-89; and 1997 WORLD
BANK REPORT, supra note 7, at 43.
11. David Flint et al., Constitutional and Legislative Safeguards Jbr FDI: A
Comparative Review Utilizing Australia and China, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 104 (Robert Pritchard, ed. 1996); STOPFORD
ET AL., supra note 7, at 222; Shihata, Good Governance, supra note 6, at xxiii-
xxiv.
12. STOPFORD ET AL., supra note 7, at 222. See Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 40;
Sherwood, supra note 6, at 104-05; EC Commission, supra note 6, at 25-329
(citing the recommendations of the EU/NIS Task Force); BROWN & DANIEL, supra
note 6, at 10.
13. Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 41; Sherwood, supra note 6, at 104-05;
STOPFORD ET AL., supra note 7, at 126; Webb, supra note 4, at 48.
14. Tshuma, supra note 1, at 78; FIAS, supra note 4; 1996 WORLD BANK
REPORT, supra note 4, at 93-97; 1997 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 7, at 8,
103-106; Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 30-31, 41; WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN
MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993) [hereinafter 1993
WORLD BANK]; Robert Wade, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
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powers are separated among branches of government,16 particularly
through the creation of an independent judiciary.' 7 This type of legal
system can be described as the Ideal Paradigm.
II. REACTIONS TO A THEORETICALLY
'UNATTRACTIVE' LEGAL SYSTEM
The dominant theory outlined above was tested in a case study of
foreign investors in Sri Lanka. A questionnaire was sent to foreign
investors in commercial operation in Sri Lanka, and further
information was collected from secondary sources, and from
interviews with members of the wider business community.'" The
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 154 (1990),
HILTON L. ROOT, SMALL COUNTRIES, BIG LESSONS: GOVERNANCE AND THE RISF
OF EAST ASIA 139-49 (1996); Shihata, Good Governance, supra note 6, at xxii;
STOPFORD ET AL., supra note 7, at 126, 138; Andrew Stone et al., Public
Institutions and Private Transactions: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal and
Regulatoy Environment for Business Transactions in Brazil and Chile, in
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 95-98 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds.,
1996); David Clark, The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law, in LAW, CAPITALISM
AND POWER IN ASIA 32 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999); KATHARINA PISTOR &
PHILIP WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 53 (1999); BROWN & DANIEL, supra note 6, at 5.
15. 1996 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 4, at 93-97; see also 1997 WORLD
BANK REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, 36, 103-06. The World Bank argues that,
although predictable corruption (i.e. when the need for, and the results of,
corruption are predictable) results in higher levels of investment than unpredictable
corruption, it is still true that the highest levels of investment are found in countries
where there is lowest corruption.
16. Shihata, Good Governance, supra note 6, at xvii; FUNDAMENTALS OF
AMERICAN LAW 27-28 (Alan B. Morisson ed., 1996); Trebilcock, supra note 2, at
30-31; 1993 WORLD BANK, supra note 14; Wade, supra note 14.
17. 1996 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 4, at 94-95; 1997 WORLD BANK
REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-8; CHERYL GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 151-153 (1998); Cheryl Gray, Reforming Legal Systems in
Developing and Transition Countries, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK:
LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE 63 (Ann Seidman et al. eds., 1999); WILLIAM RATLIFF & EDGARDO
BUSCAGLIA, THE LAW OF ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT 323 (1997); Clark,
supra note 14, at 32; ROOT, supra note 14, at 154-55; Sherwood, supra note 6, at
104-05.
18. Questionnaires were sent to the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of each
of the 402 companies in Sri Lanka, which are offered extra incentives by the
government because they are either export-oriented or operating in a priority
sector. Sixty-seven usable questionnaires were returned. In addition, thirty-three
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objective of the case study was to test how investors react to a legal
system which is not of the Ideal Paradigm.
The questionnaire used two approaches in order to establish how
investors react to a legal system that is not of the Ideal Paradigm, and
is therefore theoretically unattractive for FDI. First, it was
determined to what extent investors perceived the Sri Lankan legal
system to deviate from the Ideal Paradigm. These results were then
analysed in light of whether foreign investors would invest in
hindsight of the legal system. Second, the questionnaire tested
investor's opinions as to the attractiveness of a hypothetical legal
system which does not conform with the Ideal Paradigm.
A. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF SRI LANKA'S LEGAL SYSTEM
In 1977, Sri Lanka began the transition from an "inward looking,
socialist system" to a liberalized market economy, when the new
government tamed the opposition parties and the labor unions, and
introduced an open foreign investment. In the resulting political
stability, Sri Lanka was hailed as the "new investment centre of
Asia."' 9 However, "the investment climate.., did not remain highly
favorable for long." In 1982, a power struggle between various
factions within the ruling party led to unstable and uncertain policies,
and in 1983, ethnic strife re-emerged between the Tamils and
Sinhalese. ° Matters improved again when, after the civil conflict was
contained in 1989, a "second wave" of liberalization began in 1990.
The government reformed and relaxed its policies relating to
semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of the legal
profession, academia, non-governmental organizations, and businesses in Sri
Lanka. This research was conducted in 1997-1998, and the findings discussed
herein are on file with the author.
19. Premachandra Athukorala, Foreign Direct Investment anti Manufiacturing
for Export in a New Exporting Countrv: The Case of Sri Lanka, 18 THE WORLD
ECONOMY 547-548 (1995) (quoting the Far Eastern Economic Review); World
Bank, Country Guide: Sri Lanka (visited Sept. 1. 2000) <http://www.worldbank.
org/html/extdr/offrep/sasflk2.htm>; DOUGLASS BULLIS, SUCCEED IN BUSINESS: SRI
LA'KA 40 (1997).
20. Athukorala, supra note 19, at 547. The United States Central Intelligence
Agency reports that the ethnic conflict has created several hundreds of thousands
of refugees who have left the island since the 1980s. See Government of the United
States: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Sri Lanka (visited Aug.
31, 2000) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ce.html>.
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privatization, taxation, and customs duties, foreign exchange controls
and foreign ownership, and created the Board of Investment (BOI). 2'
Today most of the inward FDI in Sri Lanka comes from Asia and,
since the local market is small, is often export-oriented. Investors
from developing countries are generally small-scale.22
The Sri Lankan government has clearly been pursuaded of the
need for legal reform for the purposes of attracting FDI, and
consulted the World Bank Legal Department and Foreign Investment
Advisory Service throughout the 1990s. 23 A representative of the
World Bank Legal Department visiting Colombo noted in a 1997
interview that the encouragement of FDI "is in the forefront of the
government's thinking" behind current legal reform. However, he
also remarked that "one can never be sure" whether improvements in
levels of FDI "can be attributed to legal reform or not. ... but to
some extent, that thought is intuitive."2
1. Foreign Investors' Perceptions of the Legal System
Respondents were asked to describe their perceptions the legal
system, by completing a series of ten statements about the laws,
courts, bureaucrats and government of Sri Lanka. In the following
subsections, investors' perceptions of Sri Lankan laws, bureaucracy,
courts and government are examined in turn. Descriptors is the final
column of each table show whether the response option broadly
indicates conformity with (+), or deviation from (-), the Ideal
Paradigm."
21. Athukorala, supra note 19, at 547-548.
22. See generally Athukorala, supra note 19. Although slightly more than half
of the foreign firms established in the period 1978-1995 were from developed
country host states, it was developing country host states that contributed more
than half of the total foreign investment, and of total investment in firms with
foreign capital participation. Premachandra Athukorala & Ric Shand, Cultivating
the Pearl: Australia's Economic Relations with Sri Lanka, 31-32 (Institute of
Policy Studies Research Studies International Economic Series No. 5, 1997).
23. W.M. TILAKARATNA, ISSUE OF TRANSPARENCY IN SRI LANKA: A WORLD
BANK STUDY (1995) (on file with the author); FIAS, supra note 4.
24. Interview 10 (on file with the author).
25. Percentages are calculated ignoring blank responses, but including "don't
know" or "don't understand" responses. The frequency of responses is shown in
brackets next to the percentages. Although respondents were given the opportunity
[15:16271634
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Perceptions of Sri Lankan Laws
The descriptor column in Table 1 indicates that most respondents
perceived the laws of Sri Lanka to broadly conform with the Ideal
Paradigm with regard to accessibility, verification and clarity.
However, most perceived a deviation from the Ideal Paradigm with
regard to the predictability of legal change. Indeed, sixty-four
percent of respondents indicated that changes in laws and policies are
completely, mostly, or frequently unpredictable. Unpredictable
changes to Sri Lanka's laws reportedly arise from the promulgation
by the President of regulations under Emergency Powers,2'
Parliamentary legislation,27 ministerial decisions,2' and delegated
legislation.29
It can be concluded that although most respondents perceive that it
is difficult to predict what changes in law will occur, they also
perceive that once a change has been implemented, it is not difficult
to discover what the written law is. Whether respondents perceive
that it is easy to predict how the law will be implemented depends
upon their perceptions of the courts and bureaucrats, which are
discussed below.
to select from six response options for each question, in the interests of clarity,
response options are grouped, for example as "never/rarely/sometimes."
26. A 1971 declaration of a State of Emergency has never been revoked. See
CENTRE FOR INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS, JUDICIAL
INTERDEPENDENCE IN SRI LANKA: REPORT OF A MISSION 13-18 (1997) [hereinafter
CIJL]. Regulations pased by the President under the resulting Emergency Powers
include, bizarrely, the Emergency (Games of Chance) (Jack-Pot) Regulation 1995
and more seriously, the Emergency (Generation of Electrical Power and Energy)
Regulation 1997. Id. at 36-37.
27. Interviews 5, 7, 13, 22, 26, and 27 (on file with the author).
28. Interviews 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 22, 23, 25, 26, and 27 (on file with the author).
29. Interview 1 (on file with the author).
2000] 1635
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
Table 1
PERCEPTIONS OF SRI LANKAN LAWS
Statement and Responses Descriptor
Response options
Laws are (..) accessible Accessibility
never / rarely / sometimes 8 % (5) -
always / mostly / frequently 92% (57) +
Laws are (...) ambiguous or unclear Clari
,
always / mostly / frequently 18% (12) -
never / rarely / sometimes 82% (54) +
Laws are (. .) new and untested Verification
always / mostly / frequently 11% (7) -
never / rarely / sometimes 89% (56) +
Changes in the law and policies are (...): Predictability
completely / highly predictable 8% (5) +
fairly predictable 22% (15) +
frequently / mostly/ completely 64% (42) -
unpredictable
Perceptions of Sri Lankan Courts
The descriptor column in Table 2 indicates that most respondents
perceived the decisions of Sri Lankan courts to be objective and
consistent enough to broadly conform with the Ideal Paradigm.
Sixty-seven percent of respondents reported that courts could mostly,
always, or frequently be trusted to enforce laws objectively
according to transparent rules. However, most respondents perceived
deviation from the Ideal Paradigm in the area of court delays. Eighty-
five percent of respondents said that court procedures were always,
mostly or frequently subject to unreasonable delays." As one
30. A report by a committee appointed by the Minister of Justice estimated, on
the basis of judicial reports from a sample of courts, that the average case in Sri
Lanka was delayed by a period of five years. The report included examples of'
1636 [15:1627
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interviewee put it, "Litigation in Sri Lanka is a 100 percent
successful operation, but the patient is dead."" Secondary sources
and interviewees blamed delays on a lack of infrastructure, as well as
the behavior of judges and legal practitioners.':
It can be concluded that most respondents perceive court
procedures to be time-consuming, but that they perceive the decision
making of the court to be consistent, and therefore predictable.
Table 2
PERCEPTIONS OF SRI LANKAN COURTS
Statement and Responses Descriptor
Response options T
Courts can ( . .) be trusted to enforce Objectivity &
the law objectively according to Consistency
transparent rules
never / rarely / sometimes 30% (19)
always / mostly / frequently 70% (45) + _
Court procedures are ... ) subject to DelaYs
unreasonable delays
always / mostly / frequently 85% (57)
never / rarely / sometimes 15% (10)
individual cases in District Courts, some of which showed delays of twenty years,
but which seemed to suggest that commercial cases might be subject to less delays
than other matters such as family and land. See SRI LANKA LAWS DELAYS AND
LEGAL CULTURE COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE SRI LANKA.% LAW'S DELAYS AND
LEGAL CULTURE COMMITTEE 7, 45-61 (1985). Other sources indicate delays of one
year to eighteen months in the Supreme Court, four to eight years in the Court of
Appeal, and two to three years in the Colombo High Court. See Interviews 1, 14,
16, 21, and 23 (on file with the author); CIJL, supra note 26, at 54-56.
31. Interview 21 (on file with the author).
32. Interviews 8, 10, 21, 26, and 32 (on file with the author); CIJL, supra note
26, at 41; SRI LANKA LAW'S DELAYS AND LEGAL CULTURE COMMITTEE, supra
note 30, at 3.
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Perceptions of Sri Lankan Bureaucrats
The descriptor column in Table 3 indicates that perceptions of Sri
Lankan bureaucrats were mixed. On balance, consistency in
bureaucratic decision-making was slightly more often reported to be
in conformity with the Ideal Paradigm. Questionnaires indicate that
fifty-eight percent of respondents reported that bureaucrats always,
mostly, or frequently enforce laws consistently, as against forty-two
percent who indicate that this is never, rarely, or only sometimes the
case.
In addition, respondents perceived that courts deviate from the
Ideal Paradigm in terms of independence and corruption. Sixty-two
percent of respondents felt that politicians could always, mostly or
frequently influence the decisions of government officials, and a
further thirty-one percent reported that this could sometimes happen.
With regard to corruption, only twenty-nine percent of respondents
reported that it was rarely or never necessary to use bribery when
dealing with government officials. Interestingly, respondents most
frequently indicated (forty-nine percent) that it is sometimes
necessary to use corruption. This is probably the worst possible
response, since it indicates that it may not be clear to investors
whether bribery is necessary, or whether it will have the desired
effect. Only eleven percent of respondents indicated that there is
certainty in corruption, that is, it is always or never necessary.
It can be concluded that while respondents may, by a small
margin, perceive bureaucrats to be consistent, they generally
perceive those decisions to be vulnerable to corruption and political
interference. It is possible that consistency in the incidence and effect
of corruption and political interference may account for some of the




PERCEPTIONS OF SRI LANKAN BLRLAUCRATS
Statement and Responses Descriptor
Response options 1 _
Laws are(...) consistently enforced by Consistency
government officials
never / rarely / sometimes 42% (28)-
always / mostly / frequently 5800 (38) +
It is ( .) necessary to use bribery' when Corruption
dealing with government officials
always / mostly 160o (10) -
sometimes/ frequently 5500 -(35) _
rarely / never 290o (18)
Politicians can (.) influence the Independence
decisions ofgovernnent officials
always / mostly / frequently 620' (41)
never / rarely / sometimes 360,o (24) +
Perceptions of the Credibility of the Sri Lankan Government
The descriptor column in Table 4 indicates that most respondents
perceived the government to be credible enough to be in broad
conformity with the Ideal Paradigm. Sixty-nine percent of
respondents reported that the government announcements of major
policies are always, mostly or frequently credible. This is in contrast
to investor perceptions of the stability of individual laws (see above).
It may be that while the Sri Lankan government generally provides
macro-level credibility, it does not generally provide micro-level
credibility.
2000] 1639
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Table 4
PERCEPTIONS OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT
Statement and Responses [ Descriptor
Response Options I
The government's announcements of
major policies are (...) credible
never / rarely / sometimes 31% (20)
always /mostly / frequently 69% (38) +
2. Measuring the Sri Lankan Legal System Against the Ideal
Paradigm
In order to allow a more specific comparison of the Sri Lankan
legal system with the Ideal Paradigm, responses to each aspect of the
legal system were converted into a score based on a scale of zero to
five, with five indicating maximum conformity with the Ideal
Paradigm. Scores were then converted into the following verbal
descriptors: "attractive," "borderline," "unattractive," and "extremely
unattractive."33 An overall average of the scores indicates that (if the
respondent's description of the legal system is accurate) the legal
system as a whole is "unattractive," according to the Ideal
Paradigm.34
Table 5 shows the "attractiveness" of each aspect of the legal
system, as measured against the Ideal Paradigm. No institution in the
Sri Lankan legal system would be rated as attractive overall,
according to the criteria of the Ideal Paradigm. The bureaucracy
received the lowest score of all institutions, making it the least
"attractive" component of the legal system, according to the Ideal
Paradigm.35 With the exception of accessibility laws, all specific
features of each institution would be considered to be of "borderline"
33. Where 4 or above is "attractive;" 3 to under 4 is "borderline;" 2 to under 3
is "unattractive;" and under 2 is "extremely unattractive." Results were calculated
excluding "don't know," "don't understand," and blank responses.
34. The overall average score was 2.76, and 55% of respondents returned an
average score of 3 or below for the legal system as a whole.
35. The highest institutional average scores were achieved by laws (3.29), and
the lowest institutional average score was achieved by the bureaucracy (2.24).
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attractive at best. Court efficiency and bureaucratic independence
were described as "extremely unattractive."
Table 5
SRI LANKAN LEGAL SYSTEM MEASURED AGAINST THE IDEAL PARADIGM
Institution (Overall) Feature Ideal Paradigm
I _I Descriptor
Bureaucracy (Unattractive) Consistency Unattractive
Corruption'" Unattractive
Independence Extremely unattractive
Courts (Unattractive) Consistency Borderline
Efficiency Extremely unattractive
Government (Borderline) Credibility Borderline




3. Reactions to the Sri Lankan Legal System
According to the dominant theory, foreign investors seek low
transaction costs and high certainty, and these characteristics are best
secured in the context of the Ideal Paradigm. The latter provides
efficiency through high quality laws, courts, and bureaucracy; and
predictability through stable, accessible, and clear laws; limited
discretion; low corruption; and the separation of powers. It is clear
that investors perceive the Sri Lankan legal system to deviate
significantly from the Ideal Paradigm. Whether this constitutes a cue
36. Where 4 or above is "attractive," 3 to under 4 is "borderline," 2 to under 3
is "unattractive," and under 2 is "extremely unattractive."
37. The assignment of scores to responses relating to corruption was designed
to take into account the fact that businesses are expected to prefer predictable
corruption to unpredictable corruption. Since unpredictable corruption was worse
than predictable corruption, a low level certainty score (1) was given where
respondents suggested that bribery is "'sometimes" and "frequently" necessary, the
highest level certainty score (5) was given to response options "always" or
"never," and a mid-level certainty score (3) was awarded to response options
"mostly" and "rarely."
2000] 1641
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
for reform depends upon what foreign investors want. If the
dominant theory is correct, then investors should perceive the Sri
Lankan legal system to be unattractive, and therefore in need of
reform. But it appears that this is not always the case.
The very fact that respondents to the questionnaire had invested in
Sri Lanka is evidence that their opinions of the Sri Lanka's legal
system are not overwhelmingly negative. However, given that only
forty-three percent (twenty-nine) of foreign investors in respondent
companies were reported to have made a pre-investment
investigation of the legal system,38 it is possible that the original
investment was made in ignorance of the legal system. Therefore,
respondents were asked whether they would still invest in hindsight
of the legal system. Remarkably, seventy-six percent (fifty-one) of
respondents said the foreign investors in their company would still
have invested in Sri Lanka in hindsight of the legal system."
There are two possible reasons for investors' willingness to invest
in hindsight of Sri Lanka's theoretically "unattractive" legal system,
neither of which bode well for the dominant theory. First, it is
possible that some investors are neither aware of, or do not care
about, the potential damage that an inefficient and unpredictable
legal system can cause to their investment. The low incidence of pre-
investment investigations of the legal system among the Sri Lankan
sample of foreign investors adds some weight to this argument.
Support of a theoretical nature is provided by the concept of bounded
rationality. This concept explains that although economic actors may
be guided to some by rational economic motives, this does not
necessarily mean that the decisions of economic actors are always
the most efficient.4" The "normative" approach to decision making
offered by classic economics would suggest that a potential investor
should, taking into account all the relevant information, make the
decision which maximizes profit. In reality, such information may be
38. Forty-six percent (thirty-one respondents) said they had not made a pre-
investment investigation. Ten percent (seven respondents) replied "don't know" or
left the question unanswered).
39. Six percent (four respondents) said they would not, 9% (six respondents)
said they might not, and an additional 9% (ten respondents) did not know or did
not answer.
40. David Campbell & Sol Picciotto, Exploring the Interaction Between Law
and Economics: The Limits of Formalism, 18 LEGAL STUD. 249, 275 (1998).
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non-existent, not readily available, disregarded, or misinterpreted. '
In the context of a positive analysis of the relationship between legal
systems and FDI, it is the investor's decision to invest in a country,
rather than the merits of that decision, which is ultimately significant.
The measurement of risk is "a subjective business .... [i]t is
managers' perceptions that count. 42
The second explanation is no less problematic for the dominant
theory. It may be that legal systems that deviate from the Ideal
Paradigm nonetheless offer efficiency and predictability. Since
respondents perceived that the Sri Lankan legal system deviates
substantially from the Ideal Paradigm, but most would still invest in
hindsight of that legal system, it would seem that a legal system
which does not conform with the Ideal Paradigm is not necessarily
unattractive to all investors. However, as the following section
explains, a further test is necessary to establish why, and to what
extent, this may be the case.
B. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL LEGAL SYSTEM
The Institutional school of thought, upon which much of the
dominant theory of legal reform relies, demonstrates that "there is no
unique efficient result" of the interaction between legal systems and
the economy. It also argues that institutions "matter economically in
the actual costs (and benefits) they create for businesses, not in their
compliance with ideal forms," and that therefore institutions must be
assessed according to their effect on the "efficiency of economic
transactions," rather than on the extent of "their resemblance to
rational Western norms of law and jurisprudence." The World Bank
appears to be open to the possibility that a variety of institutional
mechanisms can be used to support a predictable, low cost legal
environment. However, World Bank policy has nonetheless resorted
to the pursuit of a normative Ideal Paradigm, although it does
41. YAIR AHARONI, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS 35-36
(1966).
42. STOPFORD ET AL., supra note 7, at 142 (using emphasis in original). See F.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
43. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:
FROM POSNER TO POST MODERNISM 118 (1997).
44. Stone et al., supra note 14, at 95. 99.
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studiously avoid reflecting upon the remarkable similarities between
that paradigm and Western legal systems.
Putting aside quarrels over possible tendencies towards neo-
imperialism, the most important question is whether the Ideal
Paradigm is the only attractive option. There is a lack of research
objectively addressing this question. For example, the study by
Bomer, et al., which the World Bank has heavily supported, asked
domestic and foreign investors in twenty-eight countries to what
extent they were able to use bribes or personal contacts to influence
the speed and/or outcome of the bureaucratic or judicial process.
These responses were then compared with economic growth rates in
each country, and it was concluded that those countries in which the
private sector was better able to influence the decisions of
bureaucrats showed slower economic growth rates. This was taken as
proof positive that credibility results in high economic growth.'
Two points are important here. First, a correlation between the
nature of the legal system and economic growth does not prove the
direction of causation. It may equally be the case that economic
growth provides the resources necessary for changes to the legal
system.6 Second, respondents to the Borner, et aL, survey were not
given an opportunity to indicate whether they thought such ready
access to bureaucrats was attractive. 7 If the purpose of research in
this field is to make a positive assessment of what type of legal
systems investors are attracted to, rather than a normative assessment
of what they ought to be attracted to, then it is surely essential to give
investors a free opportunity to indicate their preferences. This is the
purpose of the second set of questions in the Sri Lanka survey.
The questionnaire asked respondents to imagine that the Sri
Lankan legal system had a number of hypothetical characteristics,
and to comment upon what impact (good, bad, variable, or none)
45. BORNER ET AL., supra note 4, at 176.
46. Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A
Survey of the Issues, WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117-31 (1999).
47. BORNER ET AL., supra note 4, at 176. Similarly, a survey conducted on
behalf of the Commonwealth Secretariat gave investors the opportunity to note
whether certain aspects of the legal system were an "obstacle," but not whether
those aspects were of assistance. See Harnik Deol, Promoting Investnent in the
Commonwealth: Survey of UK Private Sector, WORLD AWARE 18 (1998).
[15:16271644
FOREIGN DIRECT INV ESTME.VT
they expected each characteristic to have upon their investment.
These characteristics were: that laws are inaccessible, ambiguous,
untested, and change unexpectedly; that courts do not enforce laws
consistently, and are subject to delays: and that bureaucrats are
subject to political interference, open to bribery, and do not enforce
laws consistently. In addition to controlling for respondents' varying
perceptions of the nature of the Sri Lankan legal system, this series
of questions provided a more detailed view of how investors react to
individual aspects of a legal system that deviate from the Ideal
Paradigm.
If the dominant theory is correct, then respondents should
overwhelmingly indicate that each aspect of the hypothetical legal
system would have a bad impact upon the value of their investments.
When responses to all aspects of the hypothetical legal system are
considered collectively, it is clear that nearly three-quarters (seventy-
four percent or 429 respondents) of the ratings were bad. However,
approximately a quarter (twenty-six percent or 147 respondents)
were other than bad-that is, "good," "variable," or "none.""'
When the ratings returned by individual respondents are
examined, it appears that just under one-third of respondents
indicated that they expected every characteristic of the hypothetical
legal system to have a "bad" impact on their investment." Those
respondents confirmed the dominant theory that all aspects of legal
systems that deviated from the Ideal Paradigm would be unattractive.
However, contrary to theory, the remaining two-thirds of respondents
expected that at least one aspect of the hypothetical legal system
would not necessarily be "unattractive." Indeed, one-third of
respondents expected that at least three of the nine hypothetical
characteristics would not necessarily have a bad impact on their
investment; and ten percent expected that more thanfive hypothetical
characteristics would not necessarily have a bad impact. It is clear
that the majority of respondents do not fully support the theoretical
position that legal systems that deviate from the Ideal Paradigm are
necessarily unattractive.
48. Excluding "don't know," "don't understand." and blank responses.
49. Thirty-one percent (21 respondents). This includes three respondents who
indicated that eight characteristics would have a bad impact, and "don't know" to
one characteristic.
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Chart 1 shows that, in relation to any individual hypothetical
characteristics of the legal system (e.g., that laws are inaccessible or
that courts are subject to unreasonable delays), between sixty and
eighty-three percent of respondents expected a "bad" impact.
However, between seventeen and forty percent of respondents
expected each characteristic to have an impact that was other than
bad. 0
Chart 1
EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE HYPOTHETICAL LEGAL SYSTEM
ON THE VALUE OF INVESTMENTS
]~C nNot Bad )
17 1 7 23 2 2 D Bad (1)
23 24 25 28 29 30
40 I Law Unexpected change
2 Court Incon,,istent
3 Lay. Inaccesible
4 Court Unreasonable delay
5 Bureaucracy Political
interference
6. Bureaucracy Bribery nec,s,uy
7. Law Ambiguous
8. Bureaucracy Incon, irtent
9 Law Untested
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Chart 1 can be taken to indicate a descending incidence of concern
(from left to right) among the sample group about aspects of legal
systems that deviate from the Ideal Paradigm. Unexpected changes in
laws, and the inconsistent enforcement of laws by courts, were
jointly most likely to be expected to have a bad impact on
investments (eighty-three, fifty-five, and fifty-three percent,
respectively). The existence of untested laws was the characteristic
50. Excluding "don't know," "don't understand," and blank responses.
Between 11% and 38% of respondents expected individual characteristics to have a
"variable" impact, and a maximum of 9% expected the impact to be "none" or
"good."
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least likely to be expected to have a bad impact upon investments
(sixty percent).
C. EXPLAINING THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THEORY AND REALITY
It was noted above that there are two possible explanations for the
fact that, contrary to the expectations of theorists, some investors are
not repelled by host states whose legal systems deviate from the
Ideal Paradigm. First, it is possible that those investors are not aware
of, or are not sufficiently worried about, the potential damage that an
inefficient and unpredictable legal system can cause to their
investment. Second, it may be that legal systems that deviate from
the Ideal Paradigm nonetheless appear to some investors to offer
efficiency and predictability. It was also noted that neither of these
possibilities has been fully explored by empirical research. However,
respondents in the Sri Lankan case study give some support both to
the first explanation, to the extent they reported a low incidence of
pre-investment investigations of the legal system; and the second
explanation, to the extent that they reported a high incidence of
willingness to invest in hindsight of the legal system, and that two-
thirds of them expected that the impact of some aspects of a
theoretically "unattractive" legal system would not necessarily be
bad. Why might that be?
1. Predictability and Efficiency in Non-Ideal Legal Systems
A hint of the answer to this question is provided by the
observation of Stopford and Strange that although a foreign investor
may "call loudly for clear, unambiguous rules," "continuity of
policy," and decisions which are "not capricious," that investors may
also recognize the benefits of a government which has the ability 'to
be flexible, to discriminate in its favor."" In the terminology of the
dominant theory, legal systems that deviate from the Ideal Paradigm
by allowing broad bureaucratic discretion, instability and vagueness
in laws, corruption, and interference by one branch of government in
the activities of another, might provide efficiency and
predictability-at least in the (all-important) eyes of investors.
To perceive opportunities for efficiency and predictability in such
51. STOPFORD ETAL., supra note 7, at 13, 135.
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legal systems requires a radically different conception of the
relationship between the private sector and the state than that
proposed by the Ideal Paradigm. In Asia, many aspects of legal
systems can be described as permeable-the private sector is allowed
to have a greater degree of access to the state than in the West. Large
businesses have "extensive pre-emptive involvement" in the
lawmaking process "that go beyond the well-known phenomenon of
lobbying in the West,,12 and businesses regularly make use of close
connections with government officials. 3 The relationship between
the state and individuals in Asia has been described as an "informal,"
"voluntary and non-authoritarian" process of negotiation and
guidance in which officials typically avoid "legal conflicts caused by
the promulgation of rules.5" Decisions are made on the basis of "a
consensus of reciprocal expectations based on shared views of right
and wrong" so that "positive law is often superfluous," and the
formal legal system is of "marginal" importance." In this
environment, it is neither productive nor realistic to view the state
and the private sector as adversaries, and it is not difficult to
understand how an investor might perceive valuable opportunities to
influence their destiny.16 Indeed Jayasuriya goes so far as to suggest
52. PISTOR & WELLONS, supra note 14, at 281.
53. GRAY, FALSE DAWN, supra note 17, at 169, 183-85. See Carol Jones
Capitalism, Globalization, and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal
Change in China, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 195-221 (1994); Anuja Rajbhandary,
Protecting Trade Secrets Through Family Businesses: 4 Case Study on Nepal, 16
INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 483-90 (1996); Jane Kaufman Winn, Relational
Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal Financial Practices of Small
Businesses in Taiwan, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 193-231.
54. For example, see a study of six Asian countries, based on 115 interviews, in
which it was found that bureaucrats could more easily resolve problems relating
debt management under insolvency by stepping outisde of the formal legal
framework, in Bahrin Kamarul & Roman Tomasic, The Rule of Law and
Corporate Insolvency in Six Asian Legal Systems, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND
POWER IN ASIA, 151-73 (Kanisha Jayasuriya ed., 1999). For an example of the
successful use in Azerbaijan of case-by-case approval by high level officials of
foreign investments in the energy sector, see Thomas Wiilde & Christian von
Hirschhausen, Regulatory Reform in the Energy Industy of Post-Soviet Countries:
Western Transplants-The Third Way?, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK:
LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GooD
GOVERNANCE 97, 110 (Ann Seidman et al. eds., 1999).
55. Kamarul & Tomasic, supra note 54, at 151-73.
56. Kanishka Jayasuriya, Introduction: A Framework for the Analysis of Legal
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that investors in some parts of Asia are so intertwined with the state
that they are essentially part of it.5" However, the relative merits of
permeability have rarely been tested.
With regard to the efficiency of permeable legal systems, most
studies focus primarily on an assessment of the costs of operating in
full compliance with formal laws. They do not take account of the
fact that in permeable states, discretion can be exercised to allow
certain dispensations from formal conditions, which may reduce
overall costs." The dominant theory is particularly skeptical of the
potential of bribery as an efficiency tool." However, as Stone, et al.,
discovered, systems that routinely rely on the use of "speed money,"
such as Brazil, can be nearly as efficient as those that do not, such as
Chile.60
Even fewer studies have attempted to quantify the degree of
predictability provided by a permeable legal system. The dominant
theory assumes that states that allow officials to have a large amount
of discretion are characterized by high uncertainty. It may be true
that "arbitrary decisions prove to be one of the biggest disincentives
to investors,"6' but decisions that appear arbitrary to some may be
perfectly predictable to others. In permeable states, economic actors
may be able to determine the outcome of their case by influencing
Institutions in Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, 10 (Kanisha
Jayasuriya ed., 1999). See ROOT, supra note 14, at 170-71.
57. Jayasuriya, supra note 56, at 10.
58. For example, the FAIS analysis of legal systems, -[i]s undertaken from the
perspective of what is required for fill compliance with all existing laws and
regulations," and De Soto's study which documented the number of steps and the
costs required to enter and remain in the formal business world in Peru. FIAS,
supra note 4 (emphasis added). It was found that, on average, it took 289 days and
$1231 (thirty-two times the monthly minimum living wage) to fulfill the eleven
steps necessary to set up a small business in Peru, without using bribes. See
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PARTY: THE INVISIBLE REVOLLTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD 134 (June Abbot trans., 1989). What that study did not assess was
whether alternative mechanisms had been developed to speed up or smooth out the
process of "going formal" and, if so, how much those alternative routes cost. See
Stone et al., supra note 14, at 105.
59. Jayasuriya, supra note 56, at 8-9. ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING
CORRUPTION 26, 139 (1988); GRAY, FALSE DAWN, supra note 17, at 153-54.
60. Stone et al., supra note 14, at 105-06.
61. STOPFORD ET AL., supra note 7. at 126; see also BORNER ELT AL., supra note
4, at 16.
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the decisions of bureaucrats or by influencing the opinions of
politicians, who in turn put pressure on bureaucrats. Clearly, the
ability to influence your own destiny provides a micro-level of
certainty, but no macro-level of certainty. However, investors may be
satisfied with the certainty of knowing that they can affect the
outcome of their own case, and be less concerned about the
consistent application of rules to other cases."
This proposition is supported by the fact that in the Sri Lankan
case study (Chart 1), thirty percent of respondents indicated that the
inconsistent enforcement of laws by bureaucrats would not
necessarily have a bad impact on their investments. Therefore, the
heavy emphasis placed on bureaucratic consistency by the Ideal
Paradigm appears to be somewhat misplaced. Furthermore, twenty-
nine percent of respondents indicated that ambiguity in laws would
not necessarily have a bad impact on their investment. In interviews
it was suggested that ambiguity can leave room for bureaucrats to
maneuver on behalf of the investor and therefore "a smart guy may
see vagueness as a competitive advantage, while others would see it
as a reason to panic. '6 1 Private individuals can "bend or manipulate"
regulations," and many issues under the BOI's control "are vague
and can be sorted out in your favor.'6 1 On the other hand, two
interviewees suggested that vagueness might not be attractive to
investors who wish to "comply with all the laws and customary
practices," and who "don't want to be tempted to infringe the laws." 6
Where the law is not roomy enough to accommodate an investors
needs, bribery offers an alternative method of ensuring a favorable
result. In the Sri Lankan case study, twenty-eight percent of
respondents indicated that the need to use bribery when dealing with
bureaucrats would not necessarily have a bad impact on the value of
an investment. Interviews and secondary materials gave ample
evidence that the private sector regularly and successfully seeks to
use bribery in order to avoid paying taxes, as well as to gain licenses
62. See Jayasuriya, supra note 56, at 10 (providing an example).
63. Interview 20 (on file with the author).
64. Interviews 23 and 27 (on file with the author).
65. Interviews 20, 23, and 26 (on file with the author).




Alternatively, investors might find it preferable to influence the
opinion of politicians, who in turn put pressure on bureaucrats to
ensure that they make the desired decision. It is perfectly plausible
that this method could provide the requisite level of predictability.
Indeed, a 1995 survey conducted on behalf of the World Bank
indicated that during the 1970s, when Sri Lanka was run in a
relatively autocratic fashion, interactions with government were
quicker and more transparent, since the President was the main
decision maker and it was easy to determine what his decision would
be. Interviewees provided two contemporary examples of the
benefits of political interference. Both involved decisions by
bureaucrats to issue and later revoke authorizations for the building
of new projects-one a private hospital and the other large hotel. In
each case, the President stepped in and negotiated or legislated for
the initial approval to be reinstated."
With regard to litigation, the dominant theory argues that courts
must make decisions that are both speedy and consistent. However,
twenty-four percent of respondents to the Sri Lankan survey
indicated that even "unreasonable" delays would not necessarily
have a bad impact on the value of their investments. In the words of
a committee appointed by the Minister of Justice to investigate
delays in Sri Lanka, "undoubtedly there could always be a minority
of litigants who may benefit from the slow resolution of cases.." It is
well known, not least by well-heeled lawyers and their weary clients,
that litigation is a waiting game, the outcome of which depends to a
significant degree on the ability of the parties to withstand the
pressure on their patience and financial resources. As one
interviewee suggested, a degree of certainty can be achieved by
"important" litigants who sometimes have the power to increase or
shorten court delays.'
67. TILAKARATNA, supra note 23, at i, 7; Interviews 3. 13, and 15.
68. TILAKARATNA, supra note 23, at 2.
69. Interviews 20 and 26 (on file with the author).
70. SRI LANKA LAWS DELAYS AND LEGAL CULTURE COMMITTEE, supra note
30, at 2.
71. Interview 1 (on file with the author).
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Interestingly, inconsistency in court decision making was more
often expected to have a bad impact on investments than was
inconsistency in bureaucratic decisions. Two factors might cause
foreign investors in Sri Lanka to be more concerned about judicial
inconsistency. First, the Sri Lankan courts are generally considered
to be above political influence and corruption.72 Second, they are
considered by some to be biased against foreign investors. 7' If
foreign investors feel that they cannot influence the court, and that
the court is biased against them, then they are likely to be ill-
disposed towards inconsistency in judicial decision making.
2. A Class of Non-Conforming Investors?
Are some investors more likely to perceive opportunities for
efficiency and predictability in legal systems that deviate from the
Ideal Paradigm? The case study of Sri Lanka indicates the possible
existence of a class of non-conforming investors, in that there is a
possible link between the failure to conduct a pre-investment
investigation, and the perception that legal systems which deviate
from the Ideal Paradigm might be attractive. Respondents who had
not made a pre-investment investigation of the legal system were ten
percent less likely (sixy-nine percent) than respondents who had
made an investigation (seventy-nine percent) to expect that
characteristics of the hypothetical legal system would have a bad
impact upon their investment. 74 It may be that some investors do not
investigate the legal system, and expect more positive outcomes from
from a legal system that does not conform with the Ideal Paradigm
because they consider themselves to be particularly well-equipped to
deal with a developing country's legal system.
There is every reason to expect that different investors will have
different perspectives as to what constitutes an attractive legal
system. For example, a foreign investor coming from a home state
72. Interviews 23 and 27 (on file with the author); CIJL, supra note 30, at 32-
35. However, two interviewees disagreed, suggesting that the courts were open to
corruption. See Interviews 4 and 25 (on file with the author).
73. Interviews 4, 13, and 27 (on file with the author).
74. Based on a calculation of overall percentages of "bad" responses for those
who did investigate versus those who did not, excluding "don't know," "don't
understand," and blank responses.
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whose legal system deviates from the Ideal Paradigm may well be
better able to deal with a similar legal system in a host state.
However, the characteristics of the investors which legal reform is
intended to support are rarely addressed by commentators."
When differences between foreign investors are noted, it seems
that those who are not deterred by a legal system that deviates from
the Ideal Paradigm are considered to be of less value to the host
country. For example, the FIAS program recognizes that the
discretionary behavior of bureaucrats "can be a particularly strong
deterrent for foreign investors who may not be politically connected,
operate under strict internal corporate guidelines, or who do not have
local partners to take care of a multitude of procedural obstacles and
associated payments." It concludes that countries with such legal
systems "may lose the 'good' foreign investors they all attempt to
attract.176 The implication is that those investors who are not
dissuaded by such legal systems are not "good." -
This position may become less tenable if and when foreign
investment flows between Asian states increases. Athukorala noted
in 1995 that the high-tech sector in Sri Lanka had thus far been
dominated by investors from industrialized countries, who "usually
place a greater emphasis on political stability" in choosing host
states. However, he goes on to remark that Asian investors,
particularly those from Korea and Taiwan, are beginning to gain
ground internationally in the high-tech manufacturing sector, and
that these investors "seem to place relatively less weight on political
and policy instability." He concludes that this development is "bound
to have immense implications in the years to come for Sri Lanka"
and other countries in the region. " The possible impact of nationality
and other investor characteristics-size, export-orientation, the
75. This issue is explored further in a book by the author (forthcoming 2000).
76. FIAS, supra note 4.
77. The theory of bounded rationality supports the Ideal Paradigm's emphasis
on impermeable legal systems, to the extent that the foreign investor who is
unfamiliar with the host country may find it difficult to benefit from permeability.
However, since the foreign investors' perceptions of permeable systems are rarely
tested, it is not yet possible to determine whether the information costs associated
with the investigating them outweigh any potential benefits which they might
offer.
78. Athukorala, supra note 19, at 562.
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existence of a local partner, and location within an export processing
zone-on the relationship between legal systems and FDI deserves
further exploration. 7 9
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The case study confirms that the Sri Lankan legal system deviates
substantially from the Ideal Paradigm. However, it is also clear that
some investors are not deterred by the Sri Lankan legal system. All
respondents invested in Sri Lanka, despite its deviation from the
Ideal Paradigm; and by far the majority indicated that they would
invest in hindsight of the legal system. In addition, in relation to most
characteristics of the hypothetical legal system, a significant minority
of respondents indicated that they did not necessarily expect such
characteristics to have a "bad" impact upon the value of their
investment.
It can be concluded that a legal system that deviates from the Ideal
Paradigm may not necessarily be unattractive to all investors. This
may be because some investors do not expect legal systems per se to
have a significant impact upon their investments. Alternatively, the
case study suggests that some investors may perceive satisfactory
levels of certainty and efficiency to exist in legal systems that deviate
from the Ideal Paradigm. The ability to perceive such benefits
appears to arise from a more flexible conception of the relationship
between the state and the private sector than that proposed by the
Ideal Paradigm. Whether accurate or inaccurate, such perceptions
will allow those investors for whom legal systems are important to
be attracted to legal systems such as that of Sri Lanka.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOST STATES
The foregoing discussion notes that Sri Lanka has entered into a
program of legal reform with a view to attracting FDI, supported by
the World Bank. The case study may have significant implications
for such a reform program. In particular, it illustrates that if the
objective of legal reform is to cater to the foreign investor, then the
first step must be to determine what the foreign investor wants.
79. Other relevant characteristics might include size, export-orientation, the
existence of a local partner, and locations within an export processing zone.
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In order to get a complete picture of how legal reform in Sri Lanka
might be recommended to proceed, Table 6 connects investors'
perceptions of the Sri Lankan legal system (Column 2) with the
incidence of investor concern relating to each hypothetical
characteristic of the legal system (Column 3), in order to suggest
what priority should be given to reforming each aspect of the Sri
Lankan legal system (Column 4). It may be concluded that the
highest priority should be given to improving the predictability of
legal change, court delays, and bureaucratic independence (all ranked
number one); and the lowest priority should be given to resolving
defects in the accessibility, clarity, and the verification of laws
(ranked number seven).
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Table 6
PRIORITIZING LAW REFORM FOR ATTRACTING FDI TO SRI LANKA
Problem Level of the Incidence of Rank"'
problem" concern"
Sri Lankan Laws
Accessibility Low High (7)
Clarity Medium Medium (7)
Verification Medium Medium (7)
Predictability of change High Very High (I)
Sri Lankan Courts
Consistency Medium Very High (4)
Delays Very High High (1)
Sri Lankan Bureaucracy
Independence Very High High (I)
Consistency High Medium (6)
Corruption High High (4)
Like the Ideal Paradigm, the prioritization outlined in Table 6 is
based on the assumption that legal reform should be guided by the
private sector, and foreign investors in particular. As a result, it does
not take into account the impact of such legal reform on the broader
objectives of the state and the local population. Some interviewees
opined that even if some investors were attracted to, or not deterred
by, those aspects of the Sri Lankan legal system that do not conform
80. The "Level of 'problem' is derived from legal system scores where:
"Attractive" is "Low," "Borderline" is "Medium," "Unattractive" is "High," and
"Extremely Unattractive" is "Very High."
81. The relative scale for "Incidence of Concern" is derived from the expected
impact of a hypothetical legal system where "Medium" concern is when the
percentage of respondents expecting bad impact is 70% or below, "High" concern
is when the percentage of respondents expecting bad impact is 71-80%, and "Very
High" is when the percentage of respondents expecting bad impact is above 800/.
82. "Rank" is based on an average of verbal descriptors in Columns 2 and 3.
1656 [15:1627
FOREIGA, DIRECT IVI "EST.IENT
with the Ideal Paradigm, this is not a valid reason for failing to
reform the Sri Lankan legal system since there is no "advantage for a
country in having legal uncertainty."'' So, whether or not foreign
investors are most attracted to the Ideal Paradigm, it is important to
consider the-potentially conflicting-needs of the wider
community.
The case of Sri Lanka is not entirely unique, but nor is it
susceptible to broad generalizations. Governments could be advised
to give priority to dealing with those issues towards the left hand side
of Chart One-that is, those characteristics of the hypothetical legal
system which were more often expected to have a bad impact upon
the value of investments. Issues towards the right side of the Chart
might be dealt with at a later date, or not at all, without serious
implications for FDI flows. Generalizations are difficult since Many
states aspiring to host FDI may not be able to offer the non-legal
advantages held by Sri Lanka. In addition, unlike Sri Lanka, most
states do not have the disadvantage of being host to a civil war.
These factors will affect the kind of investors who would even
consider investing in a host state, and consequently, the role of legal
systems as a determinant of FDI in each host state. For this reason,
the more specific findings of the case study are not necessarily of use
to other host states.
Two general lessons can be drawn from this study. First, the role
of legal systems as a determinant of FDI is neither straightforward,
nor proven, nor uniform. Second, it is important to know your
investor. Before undertaking legal reform, states must identify:
which kinds of investors they hope to attract; the extent to which
those investors actually take account of the legal system; what kinds
of legal systems, if any, those investors are attracted to, or deterred
by; and finally, what are the financial and social implications of
reforming the legal system to attract those investors. Sadly, such
calls for research may well be considered quaint in a development
climate which often equates progress with newness (if not of the
idea, then at least of the terminology), and rarely with evaluation.
83. Interview 25 (on file with the author): see also Interviews 3, 10, 18, 23, 26,
27, and 31 (supporting the same idea contained in Interview 25) (on file vith the
author).
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